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NIHONJIN NO SUGAKU [Mathematics of the Japanese People]. 
By K. Shimodaira. Tokyo (Kawade Shobo Shinsha). 1972. 
240 pp. 
Reviewed by Toshio Matsuzaki 
Oyama Technical College, Japan 
The author once wrote a book in Japanese in which he 
commented upon many important books of the native mathematics of 
Japan. In that book he gave no detailed explanation to the 
relationships between mathematicians or their schools, and to the 
social, cultural, and other backgrounds in which mathematics 
developed in Japan. 
In the new book, however, such subjects neglected in the old 
one are fully described. The book is made up of four chapters, 
in each of which the author deals with quite a few mathematicians 
in the old Japan. 
Chapter 1. Mitsuyoshi Yoshida. Yoshida spread arithmetic 
in which an abacus is used in calculation. Chapter 2. Takakazu 
Seki. Seki, the founder of the Japanese mathematics, ranked 
highest among the eminent mathematicians of our country. Chapter 
3. Yasuaki-Aida. Aida warmly disputed with the scholars 
belonging to the great Seki-school, and helped popularize mathe- 
matics. Chapter 4. Tokyo Mathematical Society. The state of 
things surrounding the advanced scholars of the native mathema- 
tics, and the circumstances under which they encountered with 
Western mathematics. 
It is remarkable that the unique higher mathematics should 
have developed in Japan for a period of only two hundred years 
since the middle of the seventeenth century. In his book the 
author endeavors to find the leading causes of that growth in 
the character, society, culture, and so forth, of the Japanese. 
EVOLUTION OF MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS: AN ELEMENTARY STUDY. 
By Raymond L. Wilder. Paperback reprinting of the 1968 
original. London (Transworld). 1974. 216 pp. 
Reviewed by Michael J. Crowe 
University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556 
The historiography of mathematics, despite some encouraging 
exceptions, has not as yet attained the sophistication of the 
historiography of science or of historiography in general. For 
example, Kenneth 0. May in his 1970 review [Math. Rev. 40, 1279- 
80] of the first edition of Raymond Wilder's Evolution of Mathe- 
matical Concepts commented that: "Most work in the history of 
mathematics has hardly risen above chronology--the essential 
empirical base." Thus he welcomed Wilder's book, as we may now 
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welcome its paperback reprinting, enriched with a new preface 
but bereft of its earlier pictures. It provides historians of 
mathematics and their students easy access to a stimulating 
presentation of much history of mathematics as well as suggesting 
a new approach, based on the use of anthropological concepts, 
for describing and interpreting mathematical developments. As 
one who has used this book for teaching purposes, I can comment 
from direct experience that it raises provocative questions 
which can help a teacher bring the history of mathematics to 
life, even though he or she may have hesitations about its 
central theses. 
The relation of history to other disciplines has been a 
topic of debate among historians for many decades, if not 
centuries. Some assert that history must draw its conceptual 
categories or explanatory generalizations from one or more of 
the social sciences, psychology, for example. Others claim that 
philosophy or theology most effectively supply these needs to 
the historian. Still others suggest that Clio is a muse, that 
the historian must employ the techniques of the literary artist. 
And of course some maintain that history is an autonomous 
discipline. It is a mark of the growing maturity of the history 
of mathematics that similar disputes--or options--are arising 
among its practitioners. For, as Professor Wilder's book 
rightly asserts, we can no longer follow the practice of 
structuring the history of mathematics so as to make it correspond 
to the deductive development of mathematics or so as to explain 
new developments solely in terms of the sudden appearance of a 
genius or great man (pp. 84-85). In opposition to these views, 
Wilder suggests that, not only the researches of anthropologists 
on early mathematics, but also the conceptual categories and 
patterns of explanations of anthropology itself, can illuminate 
the work of the historian of mathematics. When such a claim 
originates with a scholar and National Academician whose credits 
include noteworthy contributions to both creative and expository 
mathematics as well as the presidencies of the American Mathema- 
tical Society and the Mathematical Association of America, that 
claim deserves careful discussion, especially at a time when his 
book has come to be widely used, most notably as a text in the 
Open University history of mathematics course. 
Wilder's Evolution of Mathematical Concepts: An Elementary 
Study consists of an introduction and six chapters. The intro- 
duction broadly discusses different views as to the nature of 
mathematics whereas chapter one, "Preliminary Notions," intro- 
duces the reader to the anthropological approach and terms to 
be employed. The next two chapters, "Early Evolution of Number" 
and "Evolution of Geometry" trace these areas from ancient to 
modern times. The fourth chapter, "The Real Numbers. The 
Conquest of the Infinite," centers on the work of Cantor and is 
the most mathematical and least anthropological chapter of the 
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book. In the final two chapters, "The Processes of Evolution" 
and "Evolutionary Aspects of Modern Mathematics," the author 
draws upon the historical materials given earlier to present 
more fully his anthropological approach as well as to develop 
his position on the nature of mathematics itself. These two 
chapters are not unrelated, for when the author puts forth his 
position that mathematics is, and should be, a human artifact 
produced by various cultures wherein pragmatic, not idealist, 
criteria of acceptability prevail, he is criticizing present day 
idealist mathematicians as well as portraying mathematics in such 
a way as to make its history seem susceptible to an anthropolo- 
gically oriented analysis. 
Since the author's presentation of his historical information 
is reliably based on widely recognized sources, we may focus on 
the question of the validity and value of his two most explicitly 
anthropological sections which are surely the most original-- 
and controversial--portions of his book. In these two sections 
he sets out eleven "forces of mathematical evolution" (p. 163) 
and ten "Laws' Governing the Evolution of Mathematical Concepts" 
(pp. 199-201). 
Professor Wilder's eleven forces are environmental and 
hereditary stress, symbolization, diffusion, abstraction, 
generalization, consolidation, diversification, cultural lag 
and resistance, and selection. Concerning these anthropological 
terms, it is first of all to be observed that they have suf- 
ficiently obvious meanings that they may stand in greater danger 
of criticism from historians of mathematics (but possibly not 
their students) for being little more than traditional terms 
long employed than as being esoteric terms borrowed from a 
sophisticated speciality. However it should be noted that the 
adjective "Elementary" in the book's title was probably intended 
to apply both to the mathematical ideas presented as well as to 
the anthropological approach from which they are studied. Persons 
wishing to see these techniques worked out in a more developed 
form will wish to consult other writings by Professor Wilder, 
for example, his "Hereditary Stress as a Cultural Force in 
Mathematics" [HM 1, 29-461. 
The second question bearing on the value of these terms 
concerns whether they are to be construed as descriptive or as 
explanatory in function. If the latter is the case, serious 
problems for his approach may arise. These problems are analo- 
gous to those which Professor Wilder finds in historians of 
mathematics who explain new mathematical developments as 
arising because of a "Revelation" or the insights of a "genius." 
Using a term employed by seventeenth century scientists, he 
labels such explanations as "occult," citing as an example those 
who explained fossils as resulting from "fossil-making forces." 
(p. 84) And it does seem to be poor historical method to explain 
a new discovery by attributing to its creator 'great 
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discovery-making powers’ (i.e. calling him a genius). But it 
seems less than clear that the historian completely escapes 
this problem simply by moving his level of analysis from that of 
the individual to that of the culture as a whole. When, for 
example, Wilder attributes the “failure of the Greeks to adapt 
Babylonian symbolism” to “cultural lag or resistance, or both” 
(P. 154), it is not clear that this permits him to avoid the 
charge that he too has fallen into the trap of “occult explana- 
tions .‘I It seems that he is not unaware of this problem; such 
at least is suggested by his hesitations [p. 144; also HM 1, 341 
about his categorization of his eleven factors as “forces.” 
His remark that Newton did after all describe inertia as a 
force seems to point up the problem as much as it relieves it. 
If, however, professor Wilder’s terms are viewed as only 
descriptive in function, this may diminish but it does not 
deprive them of their significance. As descriptive, they may 
provide the historian access to the higher levels of anthropolo- 
gical theory where presumably explanatory categories may be 
found. However, if anthropology does provide such explanatory 
schema, they do not seem to be exhibited in this book. To take 
a specific example, consider his eleventh term “selection.” 
This might seem to have been introduced as a descriptive prelude 
to the explanatory pattern employed in evolutionary theory in 
biology, i.e. evolution through natural selection by a survival 
of the fittest. Stephen Toulmin’s Human Understanding (Vol. I) 
does make and develop the claim that the explanatory pattern 
most frequently applied to biological evolution may be used to 
understand the evolution of concepts in many fields of thought, 
although he gives little consideration of the history of mathe- 
matics. But in Wilder’s book, one will find only gentle 
suggestions that the history of mathematics may be approached 
by means of such a theory (pp. 24, 171-172). This is charac- 
teristic not only of his discussion and use of the term 
“selection,” but of the other terms as well. Nonetheless, the 
value of the introduction of a cluster of precise terms, 
especially when they provide access to the higher level theories 
of another discipline, even if those theories are not them- 
selves presented, is not to be underestimated. Moreover, if 
his terms, viewed as purely descriptive, are found to be useful 
in history of mathematics, this provides prima-facie evidence 
that mathematics, surely one of the least typical human creations, 
may be treated in the manner used by anthropologists for other 
artifacts. 
Whatever powers are possessed by these eleven concepts must 
be most clearly exhibited in Professor Wilder’s “ten ‘laws’” 
wherein they frequently occur. Let us turn to these ‘laws’ in 
the spirit suggested by the author, viewing them as “worthy of 
study with a view to their justification or refutation” (p. 199). 
Consider his first and second laws. 
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1. At any given time, there will evolve only 
concepts that are so related to the existing mathema- 
tical culture as to increase its utility in meeting 
the demands of either its own hereditary stresses 
or the environmental stresses from the host culture. 
2. The admissibility and acceptance of a concept 
will be decided by its degree of fruitfulness. In 
particular, a concept will not be forever rejected 
because of its origin or on the grounds of metaphysical 
criteria such as "unreality." 
These laws seem not only to call attention to the powerful 
influence of considerations of utility in the creation and 
acceptance of mathematical concepts, but also to assert that 
utility (including needs internal to mathematics) is the 
controlling factor in determining what will be created and 
accepted. But surely this claim is excessive, as the second 
sentence of the second law seems to admit. For that sentence 
notes that metaphysical considerations sometimes control both the 
origin and admissibility of concepts, albeit not "forever." 
Thus the difficulty with the first two laws may be exhibited by 
rephrasing them as: ~Yltility dominates, and if it doesn't, it 
will sometime.*' To make the same point differently, it seems 
that the discovery and longtime rejection of "incommensurable" 
and imaginary magnitudes was not based on utility: indeed, as the 
author points out, the former discovery destroyed an assumption 
on which the Pythagoreans "based their proof methods . ..'I 
(P. 901. Does not this discovery, being destructive of useful- 
ness, serve as a counterexample to his two laws? It may be 
noted, as Professor Wilder in fact notes (p. 90), that 
beneficial results eventually came from this. But when these 
beneficial results come years, if not centuries, later, may 
not the two laws only be saved by so extending their qualifica- 
tions that their usefulness is itself jeopardized? Also it 
seems puzzling as to what significance he would give to 
aesthetic considerations, sensitively discussed in his intro- 
duction and elsewhere; are these to be viewed as a species of 
utility? 
It is my suspicion that Professor Wilder's enthusiasm for 
the view that pragmatic, not metaphysical, considerations should 
dominate in mathematical discussions has led him perilously 
close to a somewhat "Whiggish" reinterpretation of historical 
reality. Consider in this respect his sixth and tenth laws: 
6. Needs of the host culture, especially when 
accompanied by increased facilities that may be provided 
for the nourishment of the mathematical subculture, 
will result in the evolution of new conceptual devices 
to meet the needs. 
10. Mathematical evolution remains forever a 
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continuously progressing affair, limited only by the 
contingencies described in items 5 through 7. 
These two statements seem to be less historically based assess- 
ments of what has been the case, than optimistic extrapolations 
as to what, we all hope, will be the case. For example, may 
one not argue with equal validity that certain needs, all more 
than a century old, will not be fulfilled by mathematics, that, 
for example, present failures to find solutions for the three 
body problem or to Fermat’s Last Problem will continue? To put 
the same point differently, these laws seem to lack specific as 
opposed to a general ability for prediction. The astronomer 
who tells us that the sun will someday burn out provokes little 
interest whereas the astronomer who asserts that an asteroid 
will strike us in 1980 may deserve attention. 
The core of Wilder’s third law appears to lie in its last 
Sentence : “If a group of concepts are so related as to make 
consolidation of them all within a more general concept feasible, 
then the latter will evolve.” May it not be objected to this 
law that, for it to be useful, criteria of feasibility must be 
capable of being expressed independently of the actual success 
(or failure) of the consolidation? To put it differently, did 
not Descartes discover that a consolidation between algebra 
and geometry was feasible only when he produced that consolida- 
tion? 
Wilder’s fourth law, which is a statement that multiple 
discoveries frequently occur, seems beyond dispute; moreover 
his stress on mathematics as the activity of a culture, not just 
the work of a few superior individuals, adds strongly to the 
plausibility of this law. 
The fifth law, which in effect states that “opportunities 
for diffusion . . . will have a direct effect on the rate at 
which new concepts evolve” seems, at least on the scale of 
decades, to be questionable, for the diffusion of European 
mathematics to this continent went on for a few centuries before 
“new concepts” began to evolve. Moreover, while one cannot deny 
that an important diffusion took place when “Babylonian and 
Egyptian mathematics met Greek philosophy and produced a fusion 
that was a new and entirely different kind of mathematics” 
(p. 166), one may still ask whether the cause of this result may 
legitimately be explained only as a diffusion or whether one 
does not need further specifications, such as diffusion between 
cultures possessing related and high level intellectual creations. 
Professor Wilder’s seventh law is: 
7. A static cultural environment will eventually 
stifle the development of new mathematical concepts. 
A similar effect will result from an adverse political 
or general antiscientific atmosphere. 
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May not the fact that Hellenistic culture was static in philosophy 
and literature, whereas it was rich in creative mathematics 
(Archimedes, Apollonius, Ptolemy), be cited as a significant 
counter-example to this claim? 
The eighth and ninth laws center on the notion of "crisis" 
and suggest that crises will generate productive new results 
which in turn will generate new crises. I have suggested else- 
where [HM 2, 161-1661 that "crisis" may be an overused term in 
the history of mathematics, at least if crisis is viewed as a 
phenomenon in a mathematical culture, as opposed to an individual 
or small group. The reason for this is that "crisis" seems to 
be a cry arising from the few (the Pythagoreans, Bishop Berkeley, 
the intuitionists), but denied by the majority who have a rich 
treasury of resources from which to draw crisis-preventing or 
crisis-denying positions. To take a specific case, current 
intuitionists assert that mathematics is in a crisis. To this 
numerous replies are available, neglect perhaps being the most 
prominent. Professor Wilder, whose pragmatism makes him hostile 
to the idealism of intuitionists, disposes of them with the 
remark that their work may be viewed "as an attempt to stem the 
flow of mathematical evolution--a kind of cultural resistance" 
(p. 194). It is not clear to me that he may simultaneously 
maintain this position as well as holding that crises "stimulate 
accelerated evolution of new concepts." 
Readers of this review will seriously misunderstand its 
intent if they conclude from the above critique that its author 
believes that Professor Wilder's Evolution of Mathematical 
Concepts need not be taken seriously, for the reverse is the 
case, as the above comments, correctly construed, should show. 
For I believe his book is not only an excellent tool for the 
teacher of history of mathematics, but also a work which all 
creative historians of mathematics can profit from confronting. 
It may leave those who read it unconvinced, but it will not 
leave them unchallenged. 
GRECHESKAYA LOGISTIKA [Greek Logistic]. By A. M. Eganyan. 
Erevan (Aiastan). 1972. 
Reviewed by Jacob Klein 
St. Johns College, Annapolis, MD 21401 
Eganyan's books is--in many ways--a remarkable book. It 
lists an immense bibliography with many Armenian writings. It 
contains many Greek and German quotations. The works mostly 
used seem to be those of the Dutch writer B. L. van der Waerden, 
especially his Erwachende Wissenschaft. 
Eganyan's book consists of four chapters. The first is the 
Introduction. The second is entitled "Theoretical arithmetic"; 
